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Acquiring Organizational Capital 
 
Peixin LI  Frank Weikai LI  Baolian WANG  Zilong ZHANG1 
 
Abstract 
Organizational capital is the accumulation and use of private information to enhance 
economic efficiency for a firm. Theory has argued that organizational capital is typically 
embodied in employees and the organizational structure, and is hard to transfer across 
organizations. In this paper, we study whether organizational capital is transferable across 
firms via mergers. The evidence shows that acquirers gain more from acquiring firms with 
higher organizational capital and acquirers are also willing to pay a higher premium for 
higher organizational capital targets. The evidence suggests that acquiring higher 
organizational capital targets creates synergies which are shared between acquirers and 
targets.  
 
Keywords: Organizational Capital, Mergers and Acquisitions, Synergy, Abnormal Returns 
JEL Code: G34, G32 
 
  
                                                             
1 Peixin Li is from School of Business, Central University of Finance and Economics. Frank Weikai Li is from 
Singapore Management University. Baolian Wang is from Fordham University. Zilong Zhang is from City 
University of Hong Kong. Please send correspondence to Baolian Wang. Email: bwang46@fordham.edu. 45 
Columbus Avenue, New York City, NY 10023, USA. This work was supported by the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (Ref. No. 71302127 and 71772196), the Special Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of 
Ministry of Education (Ref. No. 20130016120001), the Young Elite Teacher Project of Central University of 
Finance and Economics, Program for Innovation Research in Central University of Finance and Economics, and the 
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities. The authors are grateful to Douglas Cumming (the 
editor), two anonymous referees, Chen Lin, Alfred Yawson (discussant). Beibei Shen (discussant) and seminar 
participants at IFABS (2015), AsianFA (2015), and FMA Asia (2016) for their help with this paper. All errors are 
ours. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Evenson and Westphal (1995, p. 2237) define organizational capital as “the knowledge 
used to combine human skills and physical capital into systems for producing and 
delivering want-satisfying products.” It has often been invoked as the key factor that gives 
a firm sustainable competitive advantage in a highly competitive industry, e.g., Procter & 
Gamble in consumer goods and IBM in computers and information technology. Atkeson and 
Kehoe (2005) estimate that the payments that arise from organization capital are more 
than one-third the size of those generated by physical assets, and represent more than 40% 
of the cash flows generated by all intangible assets in the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts. 
Organizational capital cannot be completely codified and hence transferred to other 
firms or imitated by other firms. Jovanovic (1979) and Becker (1993) argue that 
organizational capital is embodied in the organization: their employees, organizational 
culture and others. Evenson and Westphal (1995, p. 2213) also write: “Much of the 
knowledge about how to perform elementary processes and about how to combine them in 
efficient systems is tacit, not physically embodied and neither codified nor readily 
transferable. Thus, though two procedures…… may use identical material inputs in 
conjunction with equal information, they may nonetheless employ…… two distinct 
techniques owning to differences in understanding of the tacit elements.”  
Although it is difficult for firms to buy organizational capital separately, mergers may 
be a way for firms to acquire the organizational capital of another. Carlin, Chowdhry and 
Garmaise (2012) and Faria (2008) conduct theoretical analysis on firms’ decision on internal 
investment on organizational capital and external investment via mergers. Firms with 
organizational capital are not necessarily those that can manage it the best. Market for 
organizational capital can emerge as a natural outcome. In this paper, we investigate 
whether acquirers can benefit from acquiring other firms with high organizational capital. 
We plan to shed light on the transferability of organizational capital across firms and how 
the market for organizational capital works.  
Our paper is closely related to a contemporaneous paper by Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017). 
They examine the effect of acquirer organizational capital on acquirer performance, while 
we examine the effect of target organizational capital on acquirer performance. Our 
empirical investigation is motivated by theoretical studies on the market for organizational 
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capital which is defined as the market where firms acquire organizational capital 
externally (Faria, 2008). Faria (2008) finds that considering the market for organizational 
capital can generate merge waves and also a few other stylized facts on mergers. Therefore, 
it is important to empirically test whether the market for organizational capital is 
important and also its efficiency by examining whether acquirers can benefit by acquiring 
targets with higher organizational capital and how this market works. 
2. Data 
We extract the acquisition sample from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We identify 1,805 acquisitions made by 1,177 firms 
between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 2011 that meet the following criteria. The 
acquisition is completed. The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target's shares prior to 
the announcement and owns 100% of the target's shares after the transaction. The deal 
value disclosed in SDC is more than $1 million and is at least 1% of the acquirer's market 
value of equity measured on the 11th trading day prior to the announcement date. Both the 
acquirer and the target are public listed in the U.S. 
We construct the organizational capital (OrgCap) measure following Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013). Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
argue that a large component of Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (SG&A) 
consists of expenses related to workplace training, organizational redesign, investment in 
information and internal communication system, and consulting, thus reflecting firms' 
investment in organizational capital. The existing studies have also conducted validity tests 
for this measure. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show that capitalized SG&A expenses 
indeed capture many aspects of organizational capital, e.g., firms with more organization 
capital are more likely to list loss of key personnel as a risk factor, are positively correlated 
with the management quality score developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and have a 
greater demand for information technology. Specifically, we recursively construct the stock 
of organizational capital 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 by cumulating the deflated value of SG&A expenses, 
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿0) ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
                       (1) 
where 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the consumer price index at year t. The initial stock of organizational capital 
is calculated according to 
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑔+𝛿0
                                           (2) 
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where g is the growth rate of firm level SG&A expenses and 𝛿0 is the depreciation rate of 
organizational capital. We set 𝛿0 to 15% and g to 10% as in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013). Missing values of SG&A expenses are set to zero. We scale organizational capital by 
the firm's book value of assets in the same fiscal year. In the main analysis, we adjust firm-
level organizational capital by subtracting its industry median where industries are defined 
based on the Fama-French 48 industries.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the sample. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at 1% and 99% tail levels to mitigate the impact of outliers. We use the 
cumulative abnormal acquirer return from two days before the announcement to two days 
after the announcement (i.e., CAR(-2,2)) to measure acquirer gains. Abnormal return is raw 
return minus the CRSP value-weighted index return. Besides target firm organizational 
capital and CAR(-2,2), we also report the summary statistics for acquirer’s organizational 
capital (which is also industry adjusted) and other variables which are known to be related 
to acquirer announcement returns. The variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. We 
see that, on average, target firms have higher organizational capital than their industry 
peers, while acquirer firms have lower organizational capital than their industry peers. 
Target organizational capital is negatively correlated with target size. We also see that 
acquirer organizational capital and target organizational capital are positively correlated, 
suggesting some positive assortative matching between acquirers and targets.   
3. Results 
3.1 Target organizational capital and acquirer CAR 
The first five columns of Table 2 present the regression results of CAR(-2,2). In Column 
(1), we find that the coefficient on OrgCap(Tar.) is 0.006, which is statistically significant at 
1% level. The standard deviation of OrgCap(Tar.) is 1. The coefficient suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase of OrgCap(Tar.) is associated with a 0.60% increase in acquirer 
announcement returns. Li, Qiu, and Shen (2016) find acquirer OrgCap affects acquirer CAR. 
The results are similar if we control for acquirer organizational capital and other acquirer 
firm and deal characteristics which are known to be related to acquirer announcement 
returns (Moeller, Schlingermann, and Stulz, 2004).  
In the next four columns, we run the same regression but in subsamples. We split the 
sample into two equal-sized subsample based on the sample median of relative deal size or 
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OrgCap(Acq.). The results show that the effect of OrgCap(Tar.) is stronger when relative 
deal size is larger and when the acquirer OrgCap is higher, suggesting that there is some 
complementarity in organizational capital between acquirers and targets.  
Our results differ from Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017). Although Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017) 
focus on the effect of acquirer organizational capital on acquirer performance, they also 
have some brief analysis on how acquirer performance varies with target organizational 
capital but fail to find any significant relation.  Our sample selection differs from theirs. We 
only analyze acquisitions where the targets are public firms. Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017) also 
consider private targets and subsidiary targets for which their parent firms are public. 
They use CapitalIQ for the data on private targets’ organizational capital, and use parent 
firms’ organizational capital as the subsidiaries’. One possible reason for the differences 
between our finding and Li, Qiu, and Shen (2017) is that including private targets and 
subsidiary targets increases the measurement errors of target organizational capital, while 
only considering public targets gives cleaner and sharper results. 
3.2 Target organizational capital and target executive retention and future SG&A 
investment 
Jovanovic (1979), Becker (1993), and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), among others, 
have argued, organizational capital is embedded in a firm’s people. We therefore expect that, 
to maximize the value of target OrgCap, acquirers are less likely to allow the target key 
personnel to leave the combined firms. Columns (7) and (8) report probit regression results 
on how target organizational capital is correlated with the propensity for target executives 
to stay. For each deal we find the target’s executives from Execucomp database in the fiscal 
year before the announcement date. We have 311 acquisitions covered by Execucomp. For 
each executive, we create a binary variable indicating whether he/she stays in the merged 
company in the second year after the merger. An executive is defined as having left a 
company in a particular year if he/she is associated exclusively with another company or 
his/her ID is not found in the Execucomp database in that year. The regression is at 
executive level. We consider all executives from the Execucomp database in the first column 
and only the top five managers (i.e., the CEO and the other four executives with the highest 
pay) in the second column. Both coefficients of OrgCap(Tar.) are significant, supporting the 
conjecture that retention of managers in higher OrgCap targets is higher.  
How will firms change their operation? In Column (9), we find that the combined firms 
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increase their investment in organizational capital (i.e., SG&A) more if the target has 
higher organizational capital. We follow Barber and Lyon (1996) and Fu, Lin, and Officer 
(2013) to calculate abnormal changes in SG&A. Specifically, we find a same-industry control 
firm that has the closest SG&A, in the year before the merger, with the acquirer and with 
the target separately. We calculate the weighted average SG&A for the target and acquirer 
in the pre-merger period and adjust it by the weighted average of the two control firms. We 
also adjust the combined firm’s SG&A by the weighted average of the two control firms in 
the post-period. Control firms are required to exist for at least three years after the merger. 
We regress the mean value of the match-adjusted performance over the three-year post-
period on the combined acquirer-target match-adjusted performance over the one-year pre-
period, OrgCap(Tar.), and acquirer and deal characteristics. The coefficient on OrgCap(Tar.) 
is positive and significant, suggesting that the combined firms’ SG&A increases more if the 
target’s OrgCap is higher. 
3.3 Target organizational capital and acquisition premium 
Since organizational capital is valuable, are acquirers willing to pay a higher premium 
for targets with higher organizational capital? Column (10) reports the results. The 
coefficient of target organizational capital is 3.606 and statistically significant. This implies 
that one standard deviation change of target organizational capital is associated with a 3.6% 
increase in merger premium. The average merger premium is around 42.5%. A 3.6% 
increase is not a small change.    
3.4 Robustness tests 
In Table 3, we conduct various robustness tests.  First, in our main analysis, following 
the existing studies (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; among others), we exclude 
withdrawn offers from the sample. However, withdrawn offers may differ from successful 
offers systematically (Cumming, Ji, Johan, and Tarsalewska, 2016; Wang, 2017). In Column 
(1), we include the withdrawn offers into the regression and find that the coefficient of 
OrgCap(Tar.) is 0.007, which is very similar to the results without considering failed deals. 
The t-value increases from 3.03 to 4.12, probably because of larger sample size. Overall, we 
think, although excluding withdrawn offers could lead to sample selection issues in some 
cases, it does not seem to be a major concern for our paper.  
Second, existing studies show that acquirers can learn from the market and their 
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acquisition experience matters for their acquisition performance (Aktas, de Bont, and Roll, 
2013; Ouyang and Szewczyk, 2016). In Column (2), we add the number of acquisitions done 
by the acquirer in the past five years as a control for the experience effect. The coefficient of 
this variable is positive (0.001, t=1.76), consistent with the learning effect (Aktas, de Bont, 
and Roll, 2013). However, adding it has minimal effect on the effect of OrgCap(Tar.).  
Third, target organizational capital may be correlated with target’s growth opportunity. 
It is likely that growth opportunity spurs investment in organizational capital, and 
organizational capital enhances growth opportunity. The transfer of growth opportunity 
from target to acquirer may also affect acquirer performance, leading to an omitted variable 
problem. To mitigate this concern, in Column (3), we add target q—our measure of target’s 
growth opportunity. The coefficient of target organizational capital is 0.007 (t=3.17), very 
similar to the results without controlling for target q. Interestingly, the coefficient of target 
q is -0.005 (t=-2.73). The negative coefficient of target q suggests that acquirers gain less by 
buying targets with higher q. This further mitigates the concerns above. 
Fourth, target organizational capital may be correlated with target’s corporate 
governance. It is likely that acquirers may benefit from acquiring better governed targets. 
Following Cremers and Nair (2005), we create a Block variable: the percentage stock 
ownership by a firm’s institutional blockholders, defined as institutional investors with at 
least 5% of equity ownership. Interestingly, target organizational capital is slightly 
negatively correlated with Block with a correlation coefficient of -0.051 (p=0.03). Column (4) 
reports the results after adding Block into the regression. The coefficient of target 
organizational capital is 0.006 (t=3.03), similar to the results without controlling for Block. 
In untabulated results, we also examine the correlation between target organizational 
capital and a few other corporate governance measures including percent ownership of the 
top 1, top 5 or top 10 institutional investors, number of blockholders, the G-index, and CEO-
chairman duality. The correlations are either significantly negative or statistically 
insignificant. Not surprisingly, controlling for them has little effect on the coefficient of 
target organizational capital.  
Fifth, in Columns (5)-(8), we vary the ways to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. 
Our results are similar if we change the dependent variable to be the raw returns, raw 
returns adjusted by equal-weighted CRSP index returns, raw returns adjusted by size 
decile portfolio returns, or raw returns adjusted by the DGTW benchmark (Daniel, 
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Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997).  
Finally, in Column (9), we show that our results are also robust to the accounting based 
performance measure. We use the same matching-firm approach as when we analyze 
change of SG&A to facilitate comparisons of industry-adjusted pre- and post-merger 
accounting performance and to control for mean reversion in accounting performance 
measures. Our accounting performance measure is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by sales, following Fee and Thomas (2004). In the three-year post-
merger period (one-year pre-merger period), abnormal performance, or, match-adjusted 
performance, is calculated as acquirer’s accounting performance (weighted average 
performance of the merging firms) minus the weighted average performance of the control 
pair, with weights being acquirer and target’s relative total assets measured at the fiscal 
year prior to the merger. Control firms are required to exist for at least three years after the 
merger. When regressing acquirer’s post-merger accounting performance on target 
organizational capital, we find that the coefficient of target organizational capital is 0.007 
(t=1.81), again statistically significant. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we find that, in mergers and acquisitions, acquirers benefit more when 
the target firms have higher organizational capital. Post-merger, acquirers invest more in 
organizational capital and their performance also improves. Top managers from the target 
firms are more likely to stay in the combined firm if the target has higher organizational 
capital. We also find that acquirers pay a higher premium for higher organizational capital 
targets. All these findings suggest that organizational capital is transferable via mergers. 
The synergy is shared among the target shareholders and the acquirer shareholders.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation (STD) and pairwise correlation coefficients) of each variable. CAR is 
cumulative abnormal stock return which is calculated as the cumulative stock return from two days before deal announcement to two days after 
deal announcement subtracted by the contemporaneous CRSP value-weighted index return. OrgCap(Tar.) and OrgCap(Acq.) are the industry 
median adjusted target and acquirer organizational capital. Size is the acquirer’s log book assets. q is market value of assets over book value of 
assets. FCF is free cash flow which is calculated as operating income before depreciation–interest expense–income taxes–capital expenditures, 
divided by book value of total assets. Leverage is short-term debt plus long-term debt divided by total assets. Runup is the acquirer buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of the period (-210, -11). Cash is equal to one if a deal is purely financed by cash, and zero otherwise. Industry M&A is the value 
of all corporate control transactions of $1 million reported by SDC for each prior year and Fama-French industry divided by the total book value 
of assets of all Compustat firms in the same Fama-French industry and year. HighTech is defined following Loughran and Ritter (2004), which is 
equal to one for firms in the SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling 
devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 
7375, 7378, and 7379 (software), and zero otherwise. Relative size is the deal value (from SDC) divided by bidder's market value of equity. 
Tender is equal to one if a deal is a tender offer and zero otherwise. Hostile is equal to one is the target attitude is hostile and zero otherwise. 
Diversifying is equal to one if the target and the acquirer are not in the same Fama-French 48 industry and zero otherwise. * p<0.1;  ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. 
   Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 CAR(-2+2) -0.01 0.09 1.00  
     
 
       2 OrgCap(Tar.) 0.19 1.00 0.07*** 1.00 
     
 
       3 OrgCap(Acq.) -0.19 0.70 0.02 0.28*** 1.00 
    
 
       4 Size(Acq.) 6.72 1.96 -0.05** -0.26*** -0.24*** 1.00 
   
 
       5 q(Acq.) 2.48 3.97 -0.09*** -0.04* -0.05** -0.07*** 1.00 
  
 
       6 FCF(Acq.) 0.02 0.15 0.05** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.25*** -0.04* 1.00 
 
 
       7 Leverage(Acq.) 0.14 0.14 0.11*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.08*** -0.25*** -0.11 1.00  
       8 Runup(Acq.) 0.03 0.41 -0.03 -0.06*** -0.04* 0.01 0.23*** 0.12 0.03 1.00 
       9 Cash 0.29 0.46 0.15*** 0.06*** -0.05** 0.19*** -0.08*** 0.17 -0.04* -0.07*** 1.00 
      10 Industry M&A 0.10 0.12 -0.04* -0.06*** -0.03 -0.01 0.16*** -0.04 -0.06** 0.06** -0.01 1.00 
     11 HighTech 0.32 0.47 -0.12*** 0.09*** -0.09*** -0.04* 0.18*** 0.01 -0.34*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.12*** 1.00 
    12 Relative size 0.45 0.92 0.03 -0.06*** 0.05** -0.20*** -0.07*** -0.08 0.19*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.04* -0.11*** 1.00 
   13 Tender offer 0.27 0.44 0.10*** -0.01 0.01 0.12*** -0.09*** 0.13 0.05** -0.07*** 0.43*** -0.05** -0.10*** 0.00 1.00 
  14 Hostile 0.04 0.21 0.07*** -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.04* 0.03 0.11*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 1.00 
 15 Diversifying 0.38 0.48 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05** -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.09*** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.07*** 0.11*** -0.03 1.00 
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Table 2. The role of target organizational capital on acquisitions 
Premium is defined as offer price to target closing stock price one week prior to the announcement date, expressed as a percentage. The definition 
of all other variables can be found in Table 1. We have industry and year fixed effects in all the models. Please see the text for the details of the 
specifications of these models. Standard errors are clustered by acquirers’ industries. * p<0.1;  ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Dependent variable =  CAR(-2, +2) Stay dummy 
Post-merger SG&A Premium 
Sample specification: 
Whole sample 
Relative size OrgCap (Acq.) 
All managers Top 5 managers Large Small Large Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
OrgCap(Tar.) 0.006*** 0.011** -0.001 0.009** 0.003 0.199** 0.176* 0.012** 3.606*** 
 
(3.03) (2.66) (-0.28) (2.38) (1.15) (2.03) (1.70) (2.33) (3.30) 
OrgCap(Acq.) -0.000 0.002 -0.011*** 0.007 -0.019 -0.157 -0.183 0.005 0.401 
 
(-0.11) (0.53) (-2.86) (0.77) (-1.38) (-0.94) (-1.09) (0.52) (0.20) 
Size(Acq.) -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.005*** 0.107** 0.088* 0.000 -0.655 
 
(-4.01) (-4.70) (-3.28) (-2.58) (-3.80) (2.21) (1.85) (0.03) (-1.04) 
q(Acq.) -0.000 -0.005 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.088 -0.175** 0.004*** 0.070 
 
(-0.38) (-1.64) (2.79) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-1.23) (-2.52) (3.20) (0.45) 
FCF(Acq.) 0.040*** 0.063*** 0.002 0.043** 0.048 1.482 1.906 -0.059 -1.376 
 
(2.82) (2.72) (0.08) (2.29) (1.24) (0.90) (1.02) (-1.43) (-0.09) 
Leverage(Acq.) 0.034* 0.045 0.048** 0.035 0.042 -1.660** -1.876** 0.023 23.754* 
 
(1.77) (1.45) (2.57) (1.21) (1.50) (-2.31) (-2.33) (0.70) (1.88) 
Runup(Acq.) -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.009 0.683* 0.795** -0.027*** -1.628 
 
(-0.30) (-0.16) (0.03) (0.40) (-0.87) (1.84) (2.09) (-3.85) (-0.42) 
Cash 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.009 0.022*** 0.036*** -0.431** -0.462** -0.004 1.472 
 
(4.19) (3.01) (1.67) (2.90) (4.41) (-2.09) (-2.31) (-0.30) (0.66) 
Industry M&A 0.000 0.034 -0.067** 0.011 -0.006 -0.076 0.328 -0.017 8.453 
 
(0.01) (1.42) (-2.42) (0.68) (-0.15) (-0.10) (0.38) (-0.35) (0.39) 
HighTech 0.001 -0.010 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.136 0.157 0.049** -0.994 
 
(0.14) (-0.77) (0.23) (0.31) (-0.12) (0.54) (0.64) (2.56) (-0.47) 
Relative size -0.000 0.001 -0.150*** -0.003 0.002 0.644*** 0.632*** -0.003 -2.119 
 
(-0.10) (0.21) (-4.49) (-0.89) (0.52) (4.40) (4.38) (-0.80) (-0.94) 
HighTech*Relative size -0.036** -0.010 -0.066 -0.047 -0.030*** -0.232 -0.198 0.023 0.783 
 
(-2.60) (-0.65) (-1.16) (-1.62) (-4.18) (-1.08) (-0.80) (1.04) (0.09) 
Tender offer 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.013 -0.011* 0.134 0.222 0.000 4.293* 
 
(0.37) (0.68) (0.55) (1.61) (-1.89) (0.56) (0.96) (0.00) (1.86) 
Hostile 0.023** 0.028* 0.004 0.032* 0.019 0.432 0.280 -0.008 9.992* 
 
(2.27) (1.92) (0.30) (1.96) (1.11) (1.33) (0.66) (-0.29) (1.94) 
Diversify -0.003 -0.010 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.165 0.194 -0.001 0.181 
 
(-0.57) (-1.26) (0.13) (-1.65) (0.33) (1.13) (1.33) (-0.19) (0.08) 
CAR(-2+2) 
     
-1.156 -1.091 
  
      
(-0.91) (-0.84) 
  Pre-merger SG&A 
       
1.048*** 
 
        
(2.69) 
 Adj/Pseudo-R2 0.085 0.148 0.039 0.072 0.089 0.142 0.140 0.093 0.041 
N 1805 903 902 903 902 1226 1036 1338 1270 
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Table 3. Robustness tests 
This table presents various robustness tests. In Column (1), in addition to the successful offers, we also include withdrawn offers in the regression. 
In Column (2), we add the number of acquisitions done by the acquirer in the past five years (denoted as Experience (Acq.)) as an additional 
control. In Column (3), we add Target q in the regression model as an additional control, where q is market value of assets over book value of 
assets. In Column (4), we add Block in the regression model as an additional control, where Block is the percent of ownership by blockholders, 
defined as institutional investors with at least 5% of equity ownership. In Columns (5)-(8), we vary the ways to calculate CAR: raw returns, 
DGTW adjusted returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997), Equal-weighted CRSP index adjusted returns, and size-decile portfolio 
adjusted returns, respectively. In Column (9), the dependent variable is a measure of firm accounting performance: operating income before 
depreciation divided by sales, adjusted by matched firms (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Fu, Lin, and Officer, 2013). We have all the control variables in 
Column (1) of Table 2, but the coefficients of these control variables are not reported. The definition of all these control variables can be found in 
Table 1. We have industry and year fixed effects in all the models. Standard errors are clustered by acquirers’ industries. * p<0.1;  ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01.  
 Dependent variable = CAR(-2+2)   
Accounting 
Performance 
  
Including 
withdrawn 
offers 
Controlling 
For 
experience 
Controlling 
for 
target q 
Controlling 
for 
target 
governance 
Raw 
returns 
DGTW 
adj. 
EW 
CRSP 
adj. 
Size 
adj. 
Abnormal 
cash flow 
performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OrgCap(Tar.) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007* 
 
(4.12) (3.02) (3.17) (3.03) (2.73) (3.28) (3.02) (2.85) (1.81) 
Experience(Acq.)  
0.001* 
 
     
 
 
 
(1.76) 
 
     
 
q(Tar.)   
-0.005***      
 
 
  
(-2.73)      
 
Block    0.000      
    (0.02)      
pre-merger     
     1.32 
  accounting performance    
     (1.30) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.074 0.085 0.105 0.085 0.076 0.097 0.085 0.085 0.116 
N 2510 1805 1609 1805 1805 1728 1805 1805 1233 
 
 
